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RITA, DISTRICT COURT DISCRETION, AND FAIRNESS IN
FEDERAL SENTENCING
LYNN ADELMAN t & JON DEITRICH t t
INTRODUCTION
In Rita v. United States,' the Supreme Court held that a sentence
within a properly calculated advisory guideline range is, on appeal, enti-
tled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.2 While Rita spoke
primarily to appellate courts, which under United States v. Booker3 must
review sentences for "unreasonableness, '4 the decision also assured dis-
trict court judges that the Guidelines truly are advisory and that they re-
tain considerable discretion to impose non-guideline sentences. To the
extent the Rita Court emphasized that in the post-Booker era district
courts have discretion to sentence outside the Guidelines, Rita is a plus in
the ongoing effort to achieve greater fairness in federal sentencing.
The Sentencing Reform Act and the rigid guideline regime it ush-
ered in have not produced fairness, and the only way to ameliorate the
harmful effects of the present system is for district courts to exercise
greater discretion. In this article, we discuss Rita and urge district courts
to exercise the discretion it reaffirms. We also discuss the present sen-
tencing landscape and some of the obstacles that courts and the U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission ("Commission") will have to overcome if they are
to achieve greater fairness.
I. RITA AND DISTRICT COURT DISCRETION
In the immediate aftermath of Booker,5 two schools of thought
emerged. The first held that Booker represented an opportunity for dis-
trict judges to, after a long hiatus, again play an important role in sen-
t District Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin; B.A.,
Princeton University, 1961; LL.B., Columbia Law School, 1965.
tt Law Clerk, Judge Lynn Adelman; Adjunct Professor of Law, Marquette University Law
School; B.A., Susquehanna University, 1992; J.D., Marquette Law School, 1995.
1. 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
2. Id. at 2462.
3. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
4. Id. at 261.
5. Although those interested enough in the topic to read this article surely need no reminder,
Booker held that the mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment be-
cause they required judges to base sentences on facts neither admitted by the defendant nor proven to
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 236-37. As a remedy, a different majority of the Court
excised those provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act that required judges to follow the Guidelines,
rendering them "effectively advisory." Id. at 245 (Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, J., Kennedy, J., and
Ginsberg, J., in part).
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tencing instead of simply calculating and applying the Guidelines; 6 the
second, believing that the Commission took all relevant factors into ac-
count when it came up with the Guidelines, held that courts should con-
tinue to follow the Guidelines in all but extraordinary cases.7 The posi-
tion of the second school later morphed into the notion that appellate
courts should "presume" that sentences within the advisory guideline
range were reasonable, subject to rebuttal by the defendant.8 Most fed-
eral circuits adopted this view,9 and in Rita, the Supreme Court addressed
it.
Rita held that appellate courts could apply a presumption of reason-
ableness to within-range sentences. However, the Court based its deci-
sion on a rationale somewhat different from that articulated by lower
courts. The Court did not uphold the presumption on the ground that the
Commission had already considered all of the sentencing factors set forth
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).' 0 Rather, the Court held that:
The presumption reflects the fact that, by the time an appeals court is
considering a within-Guidelines sentence on review, both the sen-
tencing judge and the Sentencing Commission will have reached the
same conclusion as to the proper sentence in the particular case. That
double determination significantly increases the likelihood that the
sentence is a reasonable one.II
Thus, under Rita, the district court must first independently apply
the § 3553(a) factors and determine the appropriate sentence. The pre-
sumption of reasonableness arises only if the judge (specifically) and the
Commission (generally) separately reach the conclusion that a guideline
sentence is proper. The Rita Court also clarified that "the presumption is
not binding. It does not, like a trial-related evidentiary presumption, in-
sist that one side or the other shoulder a particular burden of persuasion
6. See, e.g., United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 985-86 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 912 (D. Utah 2005).
8. Amy Baron-Evans, The Continuing Struggle for Just, Effective and Constitutional Sen-
tencing After United States v. Booker, CHAMPION, Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 32-33 (discussing the genesis
of the presumption); see, e.g., United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005) (adopt-
ing the presumption based on the Commission's expertise and the belief that Guidelines remained
"an essential tool in creating a fair and uniform sentencing regime across the country"). Fortunately,
the appellate courts rejected the notion that district courts should presume the guideline sentence to
be the correct one. See, e.g., United States v. Demarce, 459 F.3d 791, 794-95 (7th Cir. 2006) ("The
judge is not required--or indeed permitted, United States v. Brown, 450 F.3d 76, 81-82 (1st Cit.
2006)-to 'presume' that a sentence within the guidelines range is the correct sentence and if he
wants to depart give a reason why it's not correct."), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 3055 (2007).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir.
2006); United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 555 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Mykytiuk, 415
F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cit. 2005); United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005).
10. The most the Court would say is that "it is fair to assume that the Guidelines, insofar as
practicable, reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)'s objectives."
Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2464-65 (2007).
11. Id. at 2463 (emphasis omitted).
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or proof lest they lose their case."' 2 In this respect also, the Court dealt
with the presumption differently than some lower courts, which had re-
quired defendants to demonstrate the unreasonableness of guideline sen-
tences. 
13
Further, although Rita endorsed a presumption of reasonableness on
appeal (and praised the Commission's work), it did not suggest that dis-
trict courts must or should follow the Guidelines. First, the Court
stressed that the presumption of reasonableness applies at the appellate
level only; "the sentencing court does not enjoy the benefit of a legal
presumption that the Guidelines sentence should apply." 14  The Court
noted that district judges may consider non-guideline sentences when
"the case at hand falls outside the 'heartland' to which the Commission
intends individual Guidelines to apply, USSG § 5K2.0, perhaps because
the Guidelines sentence itself fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) consid-
erations, or perhaps because the case warrants a different sentence re-
gardless."' 5 Second, the Court stated that the "fact that we permit courts
of appeals to adopt a presumption of reasonableness does not mean that
courts may adopt a presumption of unreasonableness" for non-guideline
sentences.16 Thus, while the Court acknowledged that the presumption
may encourage judges to sentence within the range, it carefully avoided
intimating that sentences outside the range were in any way suspect.
II. POST-RITA CHALLENGES
A. Establishing Collaboration Between Courts and the Commission
Rita represents another effort by the Court to promote both the sen-
tencing Guidelines and the exercise of discretion by district courts.'
7
Although there is a surface tension between the Guidelines and judicial
discretion, the tension is more apparent than real. As Rita notes, the
Guidelines need not be static.' 8 The original idea behind the Guidelines
was that courts and the Commission would interact and improve sentenc-
ing practices through criticism and collaboration. 19  District courts
would, in sentencing, depart (pre-Booker) or impose non-guideline sen-
tences (post-Booker) and in doing so would offer critiques of particular
Guidelines. 20 The Commission would in turn collect and examine dis-
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Garner, 454 F.3d 743, 751 (7th Cit. 2006) ("A defendant chal-
lenging such a sentence bears the burden of demonstrating that it is unreasonable.").
14. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2467.
17. The Court first attempted this in Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 99, 106 (1996)
(holding that appellate courts should review departures from the Guidelines for abuse of discretion
only, and that only the Commission, not the appellate courts, could decide what sorts of sentencing
considerations are always inappropriate).
18. See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2464.
19. See id.
20. See id.
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trict court decisions, obtain additional input, and modify the Guidelines
appropriately.2'
Unfortunately, things did not work out as contemplated, either pre-
or post-Booker. Pre-Booker, appellate courts enforced the Guidelines
"more rigidly than anyone predicted or than the relevant statutes ap-
pear[ed] to require' 22 and made it unreasonably difficult for district
courts to depart.23 Thus, the Guidelines failed to evolve (other than as a
"one-way ratchet" as the Commission promulgated amendment after
amendment increasing sentencing ranges). 24 Even after Booker, appel-
late courts continued to police the exercise of district court discretion (at
least to impose sentences below the Guidelines) with unwarranted zeal.25
Nor did district courts distinguish themselves post-Booker. One
might have expected district courts to eagerly exercise their newfound
discretion, but generally speaking, they did not do so. A number of fac-
tors contributed to the sluggishness of district courts in acclimating to the
new regime. First, until recently, it appeared that the new regime might
not last long. Powerful Congressmen threatened to re-impose mandatory
guidelines in one form or another if district courts got out of line.26 And,
the Attorney General promoted proposals to overturn Booker.2 7 Second,
most judges on the bench have little or no sentencing experience except
under mandatory guidelines and were not used to exercising discretion in
sentencing. Finally, the fact that it is easier to sentence within the Guide-
lines may also have disinclined judges to exercise discretion.
Post-Rita, all parties to the sentencing process, the Commission, and
appellate and district courts, must redouble their efforts to make the col-
21. See id.
22. Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using
the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 83 (2003).
23. The so-called Feeney Amendment, which replaced Koon's abuse of discretion standard
with de novo review of departures, made departures even more difficult. See PROTECT Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(d)(2), 117 Stat. 650, 667-70 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §
3742(e) (2007)).
24. See Frank 0. Bowman III, Train Wreck? Or Can the Federal Sentencing System Be
Saved? A Plea for Rapid Reversal ofBlakely v. Washington, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 217, 260 (2004)
("The process of making sentencing rules by commission, which was designed, perhaps over opti-
mistically, to minimize the influence of narrowly political concerns, has become a one-way upward
ratchet. Raising Guideline sentencing levels is common and easy. Lowering them is difficult and
scarcely ever done.").
25. See, e.g., Sandra Guerra Thompson, The Booker Project: The Future of Federal Sentenc-
ing: Introduction, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 269, 270 (2006) (stating that "an overall assessment reveals that
the appellate courts are mostly ensuring that the Guidelines still have sufficient teeth to be treated as
nearly mandatory in practice"); see also United States v. McDonald, 461 F.3d 948, 960 (8th Cir.
2006) (Bye, J., dissenting) (noting that the circuit court had reversed twenty-five below-guideline
sentences and affirmed only four, while affirming sixteen above-guideline sentences and reversing
only one).
26. See, e.g., Thomas W. Hillier, II, Letter from Federal Defenders Concerning H.R. 1528, 17
FED. SENT'G REP. 319,319-20 (2005).
27. Lynn Adelman and Jon Deitrich, AG's Misguided Proposals, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 19, 2005,
at 1, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id
=l 126861513487.
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laborative process work. If, as we believe, Booker and now Rita repre-
sent the last best chance of developing a common law of sentencing,
district courts in particular must do a better job of developing such law.
They can only do this by exercising their discretion to impose non-
guideline sentences and by explaining their reasons for doing so. And
the Commission in turn must begin to listen to the district judges when
they sentence outside the Guidelines.
B. Recognizing the Consequences of the Sentencing Reform Act and the
Guidelines
Although a detailed critique of the Guidelines is outside the scope
of this article, we make two general observations about the current fed-
eral sentencing system. It is critical that parties interested in federal sen-
tencing keep in mind how the present system came about and what its
effects have been. Only by honestly evaluating what we have now will
we be able to make improvements.
1. Racial Impact
Some of the early sentencing reformers perceived the then-existing
discretionary system as leading to arbitrariness and unfairness in sentenc-
ing and wanted to address these problems.28 But others had different
motives. As Professor Naomi Murakawa has shown, sentencing "re-
form" ran on a parallel track with post-civil rights racial politics. 29 The
Sentencing Reform Act, which created the framework for mandatory
federal sentencing, fit squarely within the anti-judge themes of the reac-
tionary post-Brown v. Board of Education30 movement-judges cannot
be trusted, judges improperly rely on squishy sociological evidence to
excuse bad behavior, and liberalized racial policies, to which judges con-
tribute, generate more crime.31 Professor Murakawa writes:
By the time Congress gave its final roll-call votes on the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, the narratives of discontent about judicial dis-
cretion had been in place for three decades, beginning sharply with
southern Democrats' criticism of Brown v. Board of Education in
1954 and gaining momentum after seemingly pro-Communist and
pro-criminal Supreme Court decisions. Criticisms of judges in the
1950s and 1960s informed the criticisms that continued through the
1970s and 1980s. Recall the three arguments launched against
judges after Brown: judges abuse their power, judges worship socio-
28. MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5-11 (1973).
29. Naomi Murakawa, The Racial Antecedents to Federal Sentencing Guidelines: How Con-
gress Judged the Judges from Brown to Booker, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 473, 480-81
(2006); see also Glenn C. Loury, Why Are So Many Americans in Prison? Race and the Transforma-
tion of Criminal Justice, BOSTON REVIEW, July/August 2007, at 1, available at
http://bostonreview.net/BR32.4/article-loury.php (discussing a "front-lash" in which opponents of
civil rights sought to gain the upper hand by shifting to a new issue-crime).
30. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31. Murakawa, supra note 29, at 483-86.
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logical evidence, and judges disregard the beneficial constraints of
Jim Crow. These arguments, issued first in debates over racial inte-
gration in the context of low crime rates, had lasting power three
decades later in debates over sentencing reform and crime control.
Some supporters of Sentencing Guidelines emphasized a fairness ra-
tionale, such as northern Democrat Senator Kennedy. But other sup-
porters of Sentencing Guidelines revealed a far more complex ration-
ale, such as southern Democrat Senator McClellan and Republican
Senator Thurmond.
32
The Guidelines responded to the first count of the reactionaries' in-
dictment-that judges were out of touch and abused their power-by
mandating strict adherence to the sentencing ranges adopted by the
Commission. Indeed, as Professor Murakawa notes: "During final de-
bates over the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, supporters of Sentencing
Guidelines trumpeted judicial incompetence as a truism. ' 33  Similarly,
the Guidelines responded to the second count of the indictment of
judges-that they relied on sociological evidence-by prohibiting sen-
tencing judges from considering why an offender may have committed a
crime. The Guidelines removed from the sentencing equation any con-
sideration of motive or circumstance, as well as most aspects of the de-
fendant's character and background3 4 Sentencing courts could consider
only "objective" measures of "harm" on one axis and criminal history
scores on the other.
35
As Professor Murakawa also points out, the third count of the in-
dictment of judges-that they "generate crime by loosening the benefi-
cial constraints of Jim Crow-holds a subtle and complex connection to
sentencing and crime policy. ' 36 We accuse no one of racism, but no fair-
minded person can consider the results of the sentencing Guidelines
without noticing their racial dimension. In the post-civil rights era, when
the country has made genuine progress towards racial equality in many
areas, "the racial composition of prisons fully reversed, with prisons
turning from seventy percent white in 1950 to seventy percent black and
Latino in 2000.",3  Not only has the racial identity of most prisoners
changed, so has the length of sentences offenders of different races re-
ceive. The Commission acknowledges that racial disparity in federal
sentencing has worsened since promulgation of the Guidelines. In its
recent Fifteen Year Report, the Commission stated that the "gap between
white and minority offenders was relatively small in the preguidelines
32. Id. at 489.
33. Id. at 490.
34. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, §§ 5HI.l--5H.12 (2006).
35. See id. at ch. 5, pt. A.
36. Murakawa, supra note 29, at 492.
37. Id. at 492-93; see also Loury, supra note 29, at 8 (noting that the extent of racial disparity
in imprisonment rates is greater than in any other area of American life).
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era.'38 However, "[c]ontrary to what might be expected at the time of
guidelines implementation . . . the gap between African American of-
fenders and other groups began to widen." 39 Today, the average sentence
for a black defendant is about 25 percent higher than for a white defen-
dant.40
The Commission's research suggests that disparate treatment by
judges accounts for little if any of this disparity.41 Rather, it appears that
the disparity is the result of sentencing rules that have a disproportionate
impact on minorities.42 In particular, the law's treatment of one gram of
crack cocaine as equal to one hundred grams of powder cocaine43 and the
career offender guideline, which mandates much higher sentences for
defendants who have certain prior convictions, have had a racial im-
pact.44 The Fifteen Year Report concludes:
The evidence shows that if unfairness continues in the federal sen-
tencing process, it is more an "institutionalized unfairness" built into
the sentencing rules themselves rather than a product of racial stereo-
types, prejudice, or other forms of discrimination on the part of
judges .... Today's sentencing policies, crystalized into the sentenc-
ing guidelines and mandatory minimum statutes, have a greater im-
pact on Black offenders than did the factors taken into account by
judges in the discretionary system in place immediately prior to
guidelines implementation. Attention might fruitfully be turned to
asking whether these new policies are necessary to achieve any le-
gitimate purpose of sentencing.
45
Thus, the data suggest that judges did better in treating offenders of
different races equally without guidelines. And, racial disparity-the
most pernicious sort-has worsened under the system ostensibly de-
38. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING
(AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE
GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM) 115 (2004), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/15_yearstudyfull.pdf. [hereinafter FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT].
39. Id
40. See id. at 16.
41. See id. at 127.
42. See id. at 131.
43. Id. at 131-32. The Controlled Substances Act and the Guidelines treat one gram of crack
cocaine the same as one hundred grams of powder cocaine, despite the fact that the two substances
are pharmacologically indistinguishable. See United States v. Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d 771, 777-82
(E.D. Wis. 2005). To its great credit, the Commission has sought to rectify this imbalance. Id. at
781.
44. FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT, supra note 38, at 133-34. The Commission has suggested that
African-Americans are more likely to be subject to this guideline because easily detected drug of-
fenses taking place in open-air drug markets are more likely to occur in impoverished minority
neighborhoods. Id. The Commission has also noted that basing career offender status on prior drug
convictions actually makes the Guidelines a less accurate measure of recidivism. Id. at 134. We
suspect that in the "old days" a judge confronted with an African-American offender with two petty
drug delivery cases on his record would decline to give those priors substantial weight. Now, the
judge must sentence that defendant under the career offender guideline, which typically produces a
range of fifteen years or more, often two to three times as long as the range otherwise.
45. Id. at 135 (citation omitted).
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signed to stamp out unwarranted disparity.46 These unpleasant but un-
avoidable facts further indicate the importance of restoring judicial sen-
tencing discretion and of judges being more willing to exercise such dis-
cretion. At least in the immediate future, we see no other way of amelio-
rating the dismaying effects of our present sentencing policies.
2. Harshness
With the advent of the Guidelines, the length of the average federal
sentence rose from twenty-eight months to fifty months.47 Although the
Commission originally stated that it based the guideline ranges largely on
past sentencing practices, its methodology immediately tilted sentences
higher. The Commission decided "to calculate average pre-guideline
sentences by counting only incarcerative sentences, ''48 thus ignoring the
fact that in many cases courts imposed sentences of probation. The
Commission also constructed the sentencing grid so as to prohibit proba-
tion in all but a very small percentage of cases. 49 In so doing, the Com-
mission gave short shrift to Congress's directive that it "insure that the
guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a sentence
other than imprisonment in cases in which the defendant is a first of-
fender who has not been convicted of a crime of violence or an otherwise
serious offense ... ."50 Further, in some areas, the Commission "de-
parted from past practice and for ill-defined policy reasons decided to
impose harsher sentences." 51 Based on the Commission's choices and
the concurrent abolition of parole, the average time served by federal
defendants rose from thirteen months to forty-three months.52 Professor
Marc Miller describes the result:
46. Although the Commission did not intend this result, we suspect that some of the promot-
ers of the Sentencing Reform Act would not be surprised or displeased by it.
47. Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Disparity: Not a Reason to "Fix" Booker, 18 FED.
SENT'G REP. 160, 160 (2006) (citing KATE STITH & JOSE CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 63 (1998)).
48. Morris E. Lasker & Katherine Oberlies, The Medium or the Message? A Review of Al-
schuler's Theory of Why the Sentencing Guidelines Have Failed, 4 FED. SENT'G REP. 166, 167
(1991).
49. See, e.g., Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56
STAN. L. REv. 1211, 1222 (2004) ("Before the guidelines, almost 50% of federal sentences were to
straight probation. Under the initial guidelines, that figure dropped to around 15%.").
50. 28 U.S.C.A. § 9940) (2007); see also Beverly G. Dyer, Revising Criminal History:
Model Sentencing Guidelines §§ 4.1-4.2, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 373 (2006) ("Congress directed the
Commission to provide alternatives to prison for first offenders in 28 U.S.C. § 994(j), but the Com-
mission has never done so, despite empirical research revealing that first offenders recidivate at
substantially lower rates than defendants with criminal histories."); Lowell Dodge, Congressional
Oversight, 2 FED. SENT'G REP. 210,210 (1990) ("Remarkably, the Commission viewed this statutory
directive as a 'problem' (U.S.S.G. Ch. 1 Pt.A, p.
1
.8), because the Commission believes 'under pre-
sent sentencing practice, courts sentence to probation an inappropriately high percentage of offend-
ers guilty of certain economic crimes such as theft ... fraud, and embezzlement ...').
51. Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Fulfilling Booker's Promise, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REv. 521, 527 n. 16 (2006) (collecting sources).
52. Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 47, at 160.
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Changes in sentencing patterns over the past twenty years include a
dramatic increase in the length of federal sentences, a monumental
shift towards incarceration and away from use of straight probation, a
dramatic increase in the size of the federal prison population, and a
significant increase in the proportion of drug offenders, especially
lower-level drug offenders, in the federal system. This system loves
punishment.
53
These harsh sentencing policies have not significantly affected the crime
rate,54 and any positive effects that they have produced have been more
than offset by the harmful consequences of mass incarceration. 55  We
hope that Booker and Rita are harbingers of a reversal of course in fed-
eral sentencing policy. By exercising the discretion conferred on them-
more secure since Rita-district courts can contribute to making this
hope become a reality.
56
C. Overcoming Institutional Resistance to Discretionary Sentencing
While we urge district courts to boldly exercise the discretion con-
ferred on them by Booker and Rita to attempt to ameliorate the harmful
effects of the Guidelines, we acknowledge that in doing so, they are
unlikely to have many partners. Congress, which obviously could reform
federal sentencing laws, is unlikely to do anything significant. As dis-
cussed, in the post-Warren Court era, the criminal justice system became
a salient political issue. Legislators are unlikely to take any action that
would make them vulnerable to a charge that they are "soft on crime."
As for the Commission, although its staff has produced some excellent
studies, it has shown little inclination to seriously rethink the original
Guidelines, to downwardly modify any Guidelines, or to seriously ad-
dress post-Booker judicial decisions critiquing the Guidelines. Instead of
embracing the exercise of judicial discretion, the Commission has con-
53. Miller, supra note 49, at 1212.
54. See United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365, 375 (D. Mass. 2005) ("Indeed, most
studies attribute falling crime rates to factors other than incarceration rates, much less to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines."); see also Loury, supra note 29, at 2 ("Estimates of the share of the 1990s
reduction in violent crime that can be attributed to the prison boom range from five percent to 25
percent. Whatever the number, analysts of all political stripes now agree that we have long ago
entered the zone of diminishing returns.").
55. A number of scholars have recently written eloquently and persuasively about these
consequences. See, e.g., BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT & INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 2-3 (2006);
JAMES G. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT & THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN
AMERICA AND EUROPE 3 (2003); INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF
MASS INCARCERATION 1 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2003); DAVID GARLAND, THE
CULTURE OF CONTROL, CRIME & SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 8-9 (2001).
56. Although discretion does not inevitably result in lower sentences, the Commission's data
show that in Fiscal Year 2006, 61.7 percent of sentences were within the guideline range, 36.6
percent below, and just 1.6 percent above. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2006 SOURCEBOOK OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 52 tbl.N (2006), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2006/tableN.pdf. Thus, discretion is almost always exercised in
favor of leniency.
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tinued to trumpet the notion that the existing Guidelines take into consid-
eration all of the factors in § 3553(a).57
Nor can district courts seeking to remedy the deficiencies in the
Guidelines expect any help from the Department of Justice. The De-
partment has all but defied the Booker Court by asking district courts to
impose guideline sentences in virtually all cases, rather than to apply all
of the § 3553(a) factors. And, as indicated, appellate courts at least be-
fore Rita policed below-guideline sentences with inexplicable zeal, in-
sisting without justification that in an advisory guideline system judges
are not free to disagree with policies embedded in the Guidelines, such as
the misguided disparate treatment of crack and powder,5 8 or to impose
sentences based on "'factors that are not unique or personal to a particu-
lar defendant."' 59 Even after Rita, appellate courts continue to come up
with legal bases, derived from no statute or Supreme Court decision, for
reversing below-guideline sentences.60  Finally, as Professor Glenn
Loury notes, there is "no political movement for getting America out of
the mass-incarceration business. The throttle [is] stuck.,
61
Thus, district courts clearly have their work cut out for them. We
do not suggest that district judges become a political movement for sen-
tencing reform or for any other issue. What judges can do, however, is
provide a human check on the forces of harshness that have driven our
sentencing policies over the past twenty years. That is, if they have the
discretion to exercise that check. Judges must be free in individual cases
to say that the prison term recommended by the Guidelines is too long,
that some cases warrant sentences which involve no prison time at all,
that policies embedded in the Guidelines are misguided, and that human-
ity and mercy still have a role to play in sentencing. Booker represented
the first step in restoring to judges the ability to be fair in individual
cases. Rita was the second. This fall, the Court will decide Gall v.
United States62 and Kimbrough v. United States63 and hopefully complete
57. See, e.g., Brief for the United States Sentencing Commission as Amicus Curiae Support-
ing Respondent at *5, Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007) (No. 06-5754), 2007 WL
173622.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625, 633-34 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 63-64 (1st Cir. 2006).
59. United States v. Wallace, 458 F.3d 606, 611 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v.
Rattoballi, 452 F.3d 127, 137 (2d Cir. 2006)).
60. See, e.g., United States v. D'Amico, Nos. 05-1468, 05-1573, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS
18695, at *28-29 (1st Cir. Aug. 7, 2007) (holding that "it is usually not appropriate to excuse a
defendant almost entirely from incarceration because he performed acts that, though in society's
interest, also were the defendant's responsibility to perform and stood to benefit the defendant per-
sonally and professionally.").
61. Loury, supra note 29, at 2.
62. 127 S. Ct. 2933 (2007) (granting certiorari on the issue of whether the strength of the
justification needed to sustain a non-guideline sentence varies in proportion to the degree of the
variance).
63. 127 S. Ct. 2933 (2007) (granting certiorari on the issue of whether district courts may
consider the 100:1 disparity in the guidelines' treatment of crack and powder cocaine).
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the triumvirate, returning to judges the discretion essential to a fair and
just sentencing system.

